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REGULATING STOP AND FRISK IN NEW YORK
CITY
EDWAR ESTRADA*
I. INTRODUCTION
Imagine you are a college student and decide to help one of your
classmates move some of his things out of his grandmother's house. As
you are standing outside of the apartment building, a police officer pulls up
to the curb, points a gun in your direction and that of three other people on
the sidewalk, and yells "get on the ground! Now!" You lie with your belly
on the ground while two other officers approach you with their guns drawn.
The officer who initially pointed the gun at you says "[w]e heard someone
has a gun;" the officers proceed to search you and the three other people as
you all continue to lie face down on the ground. After finding no weapons,
the officers ask everyone for identification, write down everyone's name,
and then walk away without saying anything else.'
This is a typical example of a stop and frisk conducted by New York
City police officers in accordance with the New York City Police
Department's (NYPD) stop-and-frisk policy. This example is typical of the
denigration experienced by New York City residents who are stopped by
the police on a daily basis, particularly African-American 2 and Latino
males between the ages of fourteen and twenty-four. 3 The NYPD is most
well known for using stop and frisk because in the early 1990s, then-Mayor
of New York City, Rudolph Giuliani and his Police Commissioner,
William Bratton, instituted pro-active patrolling (also known as a "zero-
tolerance policy") where police officers were to engage persons who they
* J.D., 2014 St. John's University School of Law.
1 Complaint at 7-8, Floyd v. City of New York, 08 civ 01034 (SAS) (S.D.N.Y 2008), available at
http://ccrjustice.org/files/FloydComplaint 08.01.31 .pdf [hereinafter Floyd Complaint].
2 This term may be limiting; particularly when referring to "African-Americans" in New York City
because there is such a diverse population of individuals who are of African descent but do not define
themselves as African-Americans.
3 N.Y. CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, STOP-AND-FRISK REPORT 2011 2 (2012), available at
www.nyclu.org/files/publications/NYCLU 201 lStop-and-Frisk-Report.pdf [hereinafter 2011
REPORT]
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suspected of violating both minor and serious crimes.4 The goal was to stop
as many citizens as possible for minor crimes (i.e. loitering, public
drinking, etc.), with the hope that they would be caught committing more
serious crimes (i.e. possession of a deadly weapon, possession of an illegal
substance, etc.) while being frisked.5
Additionally, the NYPD started a data-driven program called
Comparison Statistics ("Compstat") to target high crime areas. Compstat is
an electronic computer system that allows the NYPD to map its weekly
crime statistics. 6 Precinct commanders use these crime statistics to
determine which areas officers are assigned to patrol, often times placing
them in areas with large populations of minorities. This led to widespread
racial profiling, which continues to exist today.
A recent phenomenon has also added to the complexity of New York
City's stop-and-frisk policy. Several NYPD officers have claimed,
publicly or through anonymity, they are under daily pressure from their
superior officers to make more stops and meet weekly and/or monthly
citation quotas. These officers attribute the high number of stops and frisks
to this pressure. However, Mayor, Michael Bloomberg, and his police
commissioner, Ray Kelly, deny the existence of quotas. Without more than
the word of a few police officers, it is difficult to determine whether such
quotas exist and whether they are contributing to racial profiling.
Although there is some uncertainty as to why the number of stops NYPD
officers make are so astronomical (four million since Mayor Bloomberg
took office),7 what is certain is that a substantially large number of African-
Americans and Latinos, particularly males between the ages of fourteen
and twenty-four, are stopped and frisked more frequently in comparison to
their White counterparts. 8 These reports indicate that even when African-
Americans are not the majority population in a particular neighborhood,
4 Jeffrey Fagan and Garth Davies, Street Stops and Broken Windows: Terry, Race, and Disorder in
New York City, 28 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 457,475 (2000).
5 Id. at 476.
6 Id. at 472 n.76.
7 See N.Y. CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, STOP-AND-FRISK FACTS, available at
http://www.nyclu.org/node/1598 (last visited October 2, 2014).
8 See generally 2011 REPORT, supra note 3 (reporting on the NYPD's stop-and-frisk program in the
year 2011, including all stops, frisks, force, race, and the treatment of people who were stopped); see
CENTER FOR CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT, RACIAL DISPARITIES IN NYPD STOPS-AND-FRISKS: THE
CENTER FOR CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT'S PRELIMINARY REPORT ON UF-250 DATA OBTAINED FOR 2005
THROUGH 2008 (Jan. 15, 2009), available at http://ccrjustice.org/stopandfrisk [hereinafter RACIAL
DISPARITIES]; see also OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL, THE NEW YORK CITY POLICE
DEPARTMENT'S STOP-AND-FRISK PRACTICES: A REPORT TO THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK
FROM THE OFFICE OF TiE ATTORNEY GENERAL (Dec. 1999), available at
http://www.oag.state.ny.us/sites/default/files/pdfs/bureaus/civil-rights/stpfrsk.pdf.
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they are still two or three times more likely to be stopped by the police than
Whites. 9 To make matters worse, most of these stops do not lead to an
arrest and only a very small percentage of frisks lead to the recovery of any
weapons.o In these communities, many African-Americans and Latinos do
not view police officers as enforcers of the law or protectors of their
communities, but rather as agitators and abusers of the law.11
In a recent decision, the United States District Court for the Southern
District of New York ordered several reforms be made to New York City's
stop-and-frisk policy. In its August 12, 2013 decision, the Southern
District: 1) appointed a monitor to oversee the reform process, 2) ordered a
revision of the policies and training materials related to the stop-and-frisk
policy and racial profiling, 3) ordered changes to critical stop-and-frisk
documentation, 4) required changes to supervision, monitoring, and
discipline of officers, 5) ordered a joint remedial process that will allow all
parties in the litigation to develop remedial measures to improve stop-and
frisk, and 6) required the use of a body-worn camera by one officer in one
precinct of each borough for a period of one year.1 2 Although these
solutions will help improve the stop-and-frisk policy, more is required to
ensure long-term improvements. Additionally, due to a recent appeal by
the City,13 these reforms may never be implemented.
Although New York City is best known for its use of the stop-and-frisk
policy, police departments across the country use this same tactic.
However, these other police departments do not have the high volume of
stops and frisks New York City has. Nonetheless, Philadelphia is a city
that, in the last five years, received media attention after its newly elected
mayor, Michael Nutter, adopted the high-volume and aggressive approach
as seen in New York City. 14 After Mayor Nutter took office, stops nearly
doubled to more than 200,000 from 2007 to 2008.1s Similar to stops made
in New York City, Philadelphia stops were thought to be mostly
9 See RACIAL DISPARITIES, supra note 8.
10 Id.
11 See NAACP, CIVIL RIGHTS LEADERS HOLD SILENT MARCH ON FATHER'S DAY To END NYPD
STOP-AND-FRISK POLICY (June 17, 2012), available at http://www.naacp.org/press/entry/civil-
rightsleaders-hold-silent-march-on-fathers-day-to-end-nyc-stop-and-fr.
12 Floyd v. City of New York, 959 F. Supp. 2d 668, 675-687 (S.D.N.Y. 2013).
13 NYC files notice of appeal of stop-and-frisk ruling, THE WASHINGTON POST (Aug. 16 2013),
available at http://www.washingtonpost.coln/politics/2013/08/16/63f888d2-06c6-1 1e3-a07f-
49ddc7417125_story.html.
14 See Colleen Long, Stop and Frisk Police Stop More Than 1 Million People On Street,
HUFFINGTON POST (Mar. 18, 2010), available at http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2009/10/08/stop-and-
frisk-police-sto_n_ 314509.html.
15 Id.
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determined based on race. In 2009, 72 percent of the stops made in
Philadelphia were stops of African Americans. 16
Nevertheless, in 2011, the City of Philadelphia and the Philadelphia
Police Department (PPD) agreed to modify Philadelphia's stop-and-frisk
policy. Several plaintiffs, their attorneys, and the American Civil Liberties
Union of Pennsylvania brought a class action lawsuit against Philadelphia
and its police department in Bailey v. Philadelphia, alleging violations of
plaintiffs' constitutional rights under the Fourth and Fourteenth
Amendments.1 7 As a result of this litigation, the City of Philadelphia and
its police department agreed to improve stop and frisk practices by: (1)
eliminating furtive movement, loitering, acting suspiciously, and being in a
high crime area as legally permissible reasons to make a stop, (2)
implementing periodic reviews of stop-and-frisk to see if there are any
procedures that may allow stops based on race, (3) creating an electronic
database that allows the City, police department, and the plaintiffs'
attorneys to monitor any racial discrepancies in the stops being made by
police officers, and (4) hiring a court-appointed monitor to recommend any
measures that are appropriate or necessary to ensure stop and frisk practices
comply with the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments and the Pennsylvania
Constitution. 18
This Note posits that the NYPD stop-and-frisk policy does not hold
police officers sufficiently accountable for the stops and frisks they make
and that the policy has a disparate effect on African-American and Latinos
as compared to Whites. Therefore, this Note proposes that, in addition to
adopting the reforms ordered in Floyd v. City of New York, New York City
and the NYPD give electronic database access to civil rights groups that
represent victims of illegal stops and frisks to ensure stops and frisks are
conducted legally. This Note also proposes the City create an outside
disciplinary body to regulate officers who are carrying out stops and frisks
with less than reasonable suspicion or to discipline commanding officers
who put pressure on officers to make more stops.
Part II of this Note explains New York City's stop-and-frisk policy and
the problems that have arisen as a result of it. Part III analyzes the
16 Robert Moran, N.Y Mayor Takes Shot at Philly Over Stop-and-Frisk, PHILADELPHIA INQUIRER
(May 25, 2012), available at http://articles.philly.com/2012-05-25/news/31839461_1_homicide-rate-
stop-and-frisk-program-homicide-count.
17 See Complaint at 2, Bailey v. Philadelphia, C.A. No. 10-5952, (E.D. Pa. 2010), available at
http://www.aclupa.org/download file/view inline/669/198/.
18 Settlement Agreement, Class Certification, and Consent Decree at 4-5, Bailey v. Philadelphia,
C.A. No. 10-5952 (E.D. Pa. 2010), available at
http://www.aclupa.org/download-file/view-inline/744/198/ [hereinafter Bailey Decree]
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constitutionality of the stop-and-frisk policy under the Fourth and
Fourteenth Amendments. Part IV describes Philadelphia's aggressive stop-
and-frisk policy and its similarities to New York City's stop-and-frisk
policy. Part V examines how the City of Philadelphia and its police
department have agreed to change its stop-and-frisk policy, discusses the
reforms ordered by the Court in Floyd, and argues why New York City
should adopt a combination of the two.
II. NEW YORK CITY STOP AND FRISK
A. STOP-AND-FRISK PROCEDURES
Stops in New York City begin with a form called "Unified Form 250"
but known to NYPD officers as a "250."19 This form is a "Stop, Question,
and Frisk Report Worksheet" that officers are required to fill out every time
they make a stop. The form lists several circumstances where an officer
has reasonable suspicion to believe a suspect has committed or is about to
commit a crime and where an officer has reasonable suspicion to believe a
suspect is armed or presently dangerous. According to the form, an officer
has reasonable suspicion to make a stop when a suspect: (1) is carrying
objects in plain view used in the commission of a crime, (2) fits the
description of a suspect wanted by the police, (3) exhibits actions that are
indicative of casing a victim or location, (4) exhibits actions that are
indicative of acting as a lookout, (5) has a suspicious bulge or object, (6)
exhibits actions indicative of engaging in a drug transaction, (7) exhibits
furtive movement, (8) exhibits actions indicative of engaging in a violent
crime, (9) is wearing clothes or disguises commonly used in the
commission of a crime, or (10) is engaged in other criminal activity.20
Officers use this list of circumstances to determine which individuals they
should stop. Officers can stop individuals on the street and also have the
authority to stop individuals in public and private apartment buildings.21
During a stop, officers are supposed to question suspects based only on
their reasonable suspicion to determine if a crime has been or is about to be
committed. 22 Additionally, during a stop, the police officer may have
19 Jeffrey Fagan Expert Report, at Appendix B, Floyd v. City of New York, 08 civ. 01034
(S.D.N.Y. 2008), available at http://ccrjustice.org/floyd#files.
20 Id.
21 See First Amended Class Action Complaint at 2, Floyd v. City of New York, 08 civ. 01034
(S.D.N.Y 2008), available at http://ccijustice.org/floyd#files; see also Complaint at 1-2, Ligon v. City
of New York, No. 12 Civ. 2274, 2012 WL 1031760 (S.D.N.Y. March 28, 2012).
22 N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 140.50 (McKinney 2013).
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reasonable suspicion the suspect is armed or dangerous.
Additionally, NYPD officers also use Unified Form 250 to determine
when to carry out frisks. Unified Form 250 lists various circumstances
where police officers have reasonable suspicion to make a frisk. According
to the form, an officer has reasonable suspicion to make a frisk when a
suspect: (1) is wearing inappropriate attire possibly concealing a weapon,
(2) makes verbal threats of violence, (3) has prior criminal violent behavior
officers are aware of, (4) uses force or weapon against police, (5) exhibits
furtive movement, (6) exhibits actions indicative or engaging in violent
crimes, (7) refuses to comply with officer's directions leading to reasonable
fear for safety, (8) is suspected of a violent crime, (9) has a suspicious
bulge or object, or (10) displays any other reasonable suspicion of having a
weapon. 23 The officers' reasonable suspicion that any of these situations is
occurring gives them authority to frisk the suspect to ensure the officers'
safety. 24 If the officers ultimately determine a crime has been committed,
they have authority to carry out a warrantless arrest. 25
B. PROBLEMS WITH STOP-AND-FRISK IN NEW YORK CITY
The problem with New York City's stop-and-frisk policy is best
illustrated in statistics. In 2011, the NYPD made 685,724 stops, a 14
percent increase from 2010 and a more than 600 percent increase since
Mayor Michael Bloomberg took office in 2002.26 Of those 685,724 stops,
574,483 (86.6 percent) were of African-Americans and Latinos, who
according to the latest U.S. Census Bureau only make up 54.1 percent of
New York City's population.27 Some argue that these figures reflect the
NYPD's presence in "high crime" areas, which are mostly populated by
African-Americans and Latinos. However, in 70 out of the NYPD's 76
precincts, African-Americans and Latinos made up more than 50 percent of
stops and, in 33 precincts they accounted for more than 90 percent of
stops. 28 Furthermore, African-Americans and Latinos accounted for more
than 70 percent of stops in 6 of the 10 precincts where their population was
at its lowest.29 The substantial number of stops made of African-Americans
23 Jeffrey Fagan Expert Report, supra note 19.
24 N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 140.50 (McKinney 2013).
25 N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 140.05 (McKinney 2013).
26 2011 REPORT, supra note 3, at 2-3.
27 See id. at 5; see also U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, STATE AND COUNTY QUICKFACTS, available at
http://quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/states/36/3651000.htnl.
28 2011 REPORT, supra note 3 at 5.
29 Id. at 5-6.
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and Latinos is possible because African-Americans and Latinos are often
stopped on multiple occasions; in fact, African-Americans and Latinos
between the ages of fourteen and twenty-four are often the targets of a
hugely disproportionate number of stops. 30 Though they constitute only 4.7
percent of New York City's population, African-American and Latino
males between the ages of fourteen and twenty-four made up 41.6 percent
of stops. 31 On the other hand, White males between the ages of fourteen
and twenty-four made up 2 percent of the City's population and only 3.8
percent of stops. 32 This disproportionality also existed in frisks conducted
by officers after a stop was made.
In 2011, the NYPD conducted frisks in 381,704 stops or in 55.7 percent
of stops. 33 Under Terry v. Ohio, officers need reasonable suspicion that a
person is armed or presently dangerous to frisk him or her.3 4 Yet, only 1.9
percent of frisks conducted by the NYPD in 2011 turned up a weapon.35
This suggests officers are conducting frisks with less than reasonable
suspicion. Statistics also indicated African-Americans and Latinos who
were stopped were more likely to be frisked than Whites who were
stopped.36 Of African-American and Latinos who were stopped, 57.5
percent were frisked, while only 44.2 percent of Whites who were stopped
were frisked.37 However, only 1.8 percent of African-Americans and
Latinos frisked were found in possession of a weapon, as compared to 3.8
percent of Whites frisked were found in possession of a weapon. 38 These
numbers are a strong indication that race is a factor when officers are
determining whether they should conduct a frisk.
Despite the clear racial disparity in stops and frisks, some argue that
these tactics are justified by the crimes prevented. However, the numbers
do not support this theory. In 2011, weapons were found in less than 0.5
percent of stops. 3 9 Of the 685,724 people stopped, 605,328 people, or 88.3
percent, were innocent, as evidenced by the fact that they were neither
issued a summons nor arrested. 40 Of the 574,483 African-Americans and
30 Id. at 7.
31 Id.
32 Id.
33 Id. at 8.
34 See generally Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
35 2011 REPORT, supra note 3, at 8.
36 Id. at 10.
37 Id
38 Id
39 Id. at 14.
40 2011 REPORT, supra note 3, at 15.
20 16] 3 51
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Latinos stopped, 507,641 people, or 88.4 percent, were not found to be
committing any crime. 4 1
Furthermore, 2012 NYPD data show that a decrease in stops will not
necessarily lead to an increase in crime. New York City's murder rate is at
an all-time low since the 1960s and its shootings are down by 8.5 percent
from 2011, all while 30 percent fewer people were stopped.42 These
numbers are a strong suggestion that excessive stops and frisks,
unjustifiably targeting African-Americans and Latinos, are not leading to
the recovery of more weapons or to more arrests. Instead, these stops and
frisks are leading to the large-scale denigration of African-Americans and
Latinos throughout the City.
African-Americans and Latinos experience belittling from the NYPD on
a daily basis. Some are stopped in their neighborhood and questioned,
frisked, humiliated, and disrespected by the police. 43 Officers will often
require citizens to place their hands on their head, place their hands on a
vehicle, stand against a wall, or lay on the ground as they conduct a
search,44 demeaning African-Americans and Latinos who are innocent of
any crime. Police also commonly use force during these stops. 45 In 2011,
far more African-Americans and Latinos had force used against them than
did Whites.46 Force usually involves a police officer placing his or her
hands on a suspect to restrain him or her. However, force can also be
defined as the use of a weapon against a suspect. In 2011, police officers
used force against African-Americans and Latinos in 129,590 stops; force
was only uses in 9,765 stops of Whites. 47 The victims are then let go with
no explanation of why they were stopped or frisked.48 Some are stopped in
41 Id at 15, 17.
42 See New York City Murder Rate 2012: NYPD Says Number of Homicides This Year on Pace To
Reach Historic Low, HUFFINGTON POST, (Dec. 26, 2012, 5:43 PM),
http://www.buffingtonpost.com/2012/12/26/new-york-city-murder-rate-2012-nypd-homicides-historic-
low n 2366852.html; see also New York City Gun Violence And NYPD Stop-And-Frisks Both See
Decline In 2012, HUFFINGTON POST, (Dec. 26, 2012, 12:02 PM),
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/12/26/new-york-city-gun-violence-nypd-stop-and-
frisks n_2364869.html?utm hp refnew-york.
43 See Ross Tuttle & Erin Schneider, The Hunted and the Hated: An Inside Look at the NYPD 's
Stop-and-Frisk Policy, THE NATION, (Oct. 8, 2012), http://www.thenation.com/article/170413/stopped-
and-frisked-being-fking-mutt-video.
44 See Floyd Complaint at 17-23; see also Complaint at 12-18, Davis v. City of New York, 10 Civ
0699 (S.D.N.Y. 2010), available at http://www.naacpldf.org/case/davis-vs-city-new-york.
45 See 2011 REPORT, supra note 3, at 11; see also Secret Recording of Stop-and-Frisk Makes it to
Federal Court, Francis Reynolds, THE NATION, (Aug. 13, 2012),
http://www.thenation.com/blog/l 75728/secret-recording-stop-and-frisk-makes-it-federal-court.
46 2011 REPORT, supra note 3, at 12.
47 Id.
48 See Tuttle & Schneider, supra note 43.
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their own apartment buildings and asked to show identification, often
multiple times in one day.49 Visiting family members and friends are
stopped in apartment building lobbies, asked to show identification,
questioned about their presence in the building, sometimes frisked, and
then given a summons for trespassing.50 The New York City stop-and-frisk
policy has created resentment for police throughout the City, particularly in
African-American and Latino communities. 51 Rather than embrace police
presence, these communities detest it and often times fear it.52
Another problem with New York City's stop-and-frisk policy is ihat
Unified Form 250 gives officers too much discretion in determining when
it is appropriate to make a stop or frisk and does not hold them accountable
once they have made such stops or frisks. Several items on the 250-form
are vague or not sufficiently limiting. The most compelling example is the
use of the term "furtive movement." According to the 250-form, an officer
has reasonable suspicion to stop and/or frisk someone if that person
exhibits "furtive movement." However, the form does not define "furtive
movement." Instead, officers individually determine what they believe to
be "furtive movement." This lack of clarity gives officers the authority to
not only to define "furtive movement," but also to change their definition
based on the circumstances; furtive movement in one neighborhood might
not be considered furtive movement in another neighborhood. Officers can
adjust their definition to justify illegal stops and frisks. In 2011, furtive
movement was the most common reason identified by police officers for
making a stop, appearing in 351,739 out of the 658,724 (51.3%) stops
made. 53 The magnitude of these numbers suggests that officers find
"furtive movement" is the easiest way to justify more than half the stops
they make. Without any guidelines of what is a legal stop as a result of
"furtive movement," officers can continue to make a high volume of stops
based on their own definition of the term.
The 250-form is also problematic because officers are not required to
explain every stop or frisk they make. The 250-form requires officers only
49 See generally Complaint at 7-30, Ligon v. City of New York, 2012 WL 1031760 (S.D.N.Y).
50 See id.
51 See Stephon Johnson, More NYers Unhappy with Stop-and-Frisk, N.Y. AMSTERDAM NEWS,
(Nov. 29, 2009), http://www.maketheroad.org/article.php?ID=2536; see also Chris Meyer, As Stop-and-
Frisk Anger Grows, Local City Council Members Step Up, COLUMBIA DAILY SPECTATOR (Dec. 6,
2012), http://www.columbiaspectator.com/2012/12/06/stop-and-frisk-anger-grows-local-city-council-
members-step.
52 See Christie Thompson, Momentum Builds in the Fight Against Stop-and-Frisk, THE NATION
(Oct. 31, 2012), http://www.thenation.com/article/170944/momentum-builds-fight-against-stop-and-
frisk#.
53 2011 REPORT, supra note 3, at 4 (2012).
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to "(Describe)" a "Suspicious Bulge/Object" and to "(Specify)" when they
made a stop or frisk based on "Other Reasonable Suspicion Of Criminal
Activity." 54 In every other instance, officers merely have to check off a box
without any explanation of why that box was checked off.55 In turn,
officers are not accountable if they make illegal stops or frisks because they
do not have to explain what actions led them to check off a particular
circumstance. Without such a requirement, officers have the authority to
stop and frisk someone for legal reasons, discriminatory reasons, or for no
reason at all. These problems have led many citizens and civil rights
groups to question the constitutionality of the stop-and-frisk policy.
III. CONSTITUTIONALITY OF STOP AND FRISK
A. FOURTH AMENDMENT
The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution states that the
right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no
Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath and
affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the
persons or things to be seized. 56
Analysis of the constitutionality of the stop-and-frisk policy focuses on
an interpretation of the first clause ("reasonableness clause") of the Fourth
Amendment because the policy is based on warrantless searches and
seizures.57 The second clause ("warrant clause") applies only in instances
where officers had a warrant or were required to get a warrant. The
essential purpose of the first clause is to "impose a standard of
'reasonableness' upon the exercise of discretion by government officials,
including law enforcement agents, in order 'to safeguard the privacy and
security of individuals against arbitrary invasions."' 58 The Fourth
Amendment's reasonableness clause is intended to create limitations
assuring an individual's "reasonable expectation of privacy is not 'subject
to the discretion of the official in the field."' 59 In Terry v. Ohio, Chief
Justice Earl Warren, in his opinion for the Court, set standards of
54 Floyd Complaint at 27-28.
55 Id.
56 U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
57 Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 20 (1968).
58 See Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 653-654 (1979); see also Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc., 436
U.S. 307, 312 (1978) (quoting Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 528 (1967)).
59 Prouse, 440 U.S. at 655 (quoting Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 532 (1967)).
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evaluating stops and frisks to ensure that officers did not unreasonably
intrude upon citizens' security and privacy.60
1. The Establishment of Stop-and-Frisk Under the Fourth Amendment
Terry was the first Supreme Court case to hold that stops and frisks were
subject to the limitations of the Fourth Amendment's reasonableness
clause. A "stop" is brief and serves the purpose of investigating criminal
behavior,61 while a "seizure" requires probable cause because it is typically
an arrest. 62 A "frisk" is a limited search of the outer clothing in attempt to
discover weapons that might be used to assault an officer,63 while a
"search" requires probable cause because it is more intrusive. 64 Prior to
Terry, states argued that the smaller degree of intrusiveness in stops and
frisks as compared to arrests (or seizures) and searches meant that
individuals were not entitled to Fourth Amendment protection when
subjected to stops and frisks. 65 However, in Terry, Chief Justice Warren,
writing for the Court, eliminated this notion by holding that "whenever a
police officer accosts an individual and restrains his freedom to walk away,
he has 'seized' that person." 66 Additionally, Chief Justice Warren failed to
see why a "frisk" would not receive the same Fourth Amendment
protection as a "search," asserting that a frisk was a "serious intrusion upon
the sanctity of the person, which may inflict great indignity and arouse
strong resentment, and it is not to be undertaken lightly." 67 The Court held
that the distinctions in Fourth Amendment protection made between "stop",
"seizure", "frisk" and "search" were not only incorrect but also
dangerous. 68 The Court declared that these distinctions "isolate from
constitutional scrutiny the initial stages of the contact between the
policeman and the citizen" and "obscure the utility of limitations upon the
scope ... of police action as a means of constitutional regulation." 69
Therefore, the Court rejected the notion that the Fourth Amendment is not
applicable to a "stop" or "frisk" simply because police conduct stops "short
60 See Terry, 392 U.S. 1.
61 Id. at 22.
62 See id
63 Id. at 30.
6 See id.
65 See e.g., id at 10; see also People v. Rivera, 14 N.Y.2d 441 (1964).
66 Terry, 392 U.S. at 16.
67 Id. at 17.
68 Id
69 Id
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of something called a 'technical arrest' or a 'full-blown' search." 70
Although the Terry court held that individuals were entitled to Fourth
Amendment protection from stops and frisks, it also indicated that officers
were permitted to make stops and frisks under specific circumstances.
Specifically, the Court declared that the general interest in effective crime
prevention and detection underlie the recognition that an officer can make a
stop "for purposes of investigating possibly criminal behavior even though
there is no probable cause to make an arrest." 71 Moreover, the immediate
interest of police officers in taking steps to assure that the person they are
dealing with is not armed with a weapon that could unexpectedly and
fatally be used against them is sufficient to allow officers to conduct
frisks.72 However, stops and frisks must still be reasonable under the
"reasonableness clause" of the Fourth Amendment.
The Court in Terry created standards under which the reasonableness of
stops and frisks should be evaluated. The Court did not create limitations
for stops and frisks, but rather stated that those limitations would have to be
developed "in the concrete factual circumstances of individual cases." 73 In
determining whether a stop or frisk is unreasonable, a court's inquiry is
two-fold: "whether the officer's action was justified at its inception, and
whether it was reasonably related in scope to the circumstances which
justified the interference in the first place." 74 In justifying a stop or frisk
under the Fourth Amendment's "reasonableness clause," an officer must be
able to point to "specific and articulable facts which, taken together with
rational inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant that intrusion." 75
Courts must use an objective standard to determine whether "the facts
available to the officer at the moment of the seizure or the search 'warrant a
man of reasonable caution in the belief that the action taken was
appropriate?" 76 An officer's inarticulate or inchoate suspicions or hunches
will not suffice to meet this standard.77
Despite the court's willingness to give police officers the constitutional
power to seize and search citizens with less than probable cause, the Court
acknowledged the potential negative effects. It recognized that the police
often initiate street encounters and some times those encounters are
70 Id. at 19.
71 Id. at 22.
72 Terry, 392 U.S. at 23.
73 Id. at 29.
74 Id. at 20.
75 Id. at 21.
76 Id at 21-22.
77 Terry, 392 U.S. at 22, 27.
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unrelated to a desire to prosecute crime. It further acknowledged that some
police field interrogation tactics violate the Fourth Amendment and are
used to harass minority groups, particularly "Negroes." 78 However, Chief
Justice Warren, in his opinion, stated that restricting officers from using the
stop-and-frisk policy would "deter invasions of constitutionally guaranteed
rights where the police either have no interest in prosecuting or are willing
to forgo successful prosecution in the interest of serving some other
goal." 79 On the other hand, he stated that under Terry "courts still retain
their traditional responsibility to guard against police conduct which is
overbearing or harassing, or which entrenches upon personal security
without the objective evidentiary justification which the Constitution
requires."80 Although Chief Justice Warren understood the potential
ramifications of granting police officers more power to "harass"
individuals, he thought the governmental interest coupled with the
standards set for stops and frisks outweighed those ramifications.
2. Fourth Amendment Analysis of New York City's Stop-and-Frisk
Policy
Due to the fact-specific nature of the standard set by Terry, it appears
that New York City's stop-and-frisk policy cannot, on its face, be tested for
its constitutionality under the reasonableness clause of the Fourth
Amendment. According to Terry, a court would need the specific facts of a
stop or frisk to determine whether the stop or frisk was reasonable. For
example, Terry requires courts to decide whether an officer's actions were
justified at its inception. 81 A court would not be able to determine whether
an officer's actions were justified simply by looking at the New York State
statute for stop-and-frisk (§140.50 of the Criminal Procedure Law
("CPL"))82 or Unified Form 250. Neither § 140.50 of the CPL nor the 250-
Form provides specific facts that would assist a court in determining if an
officer in a particular stop or frisk was justified, at its inception, in making
that specific intrusion. Therefore, despite the disparity in the amount of
stops and frisks, it appears that a court would have to do a case by case
analysis to determine if this disparity is due to violations of rights protected
78 Id. at 13-15 (Terry was decided in 1968, during an era when the term "Negroes" was used when
referring to African-Americans. The more conventional term in 2013 is "African-Americans").
79 Id. at 14.
80 Id. at 15.
81 Id at 20.
82 N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 140.50 (McKinney 2013) (This statute guides stop-and-frisk policies
in New York State while Unified Form 250 guides the NYPD's stop-and-frisk policy).
2016] 357
JOURNALOFCIVLRIGI7S & ECONOACDEVELOPMENT [Vol. 28:3
by the Fourth Amendment.
However, in the August decision Floyd v. City of New York, a stop-and-
frisk lawsuit challenging the policy's constitutionality, the United States
District Court for the Southern District of New York found New York
City's stop-and-frisk policy unconstitutional under the Fourth Amendment
based on the disparities of stops and on New York City's and the NYPD's
indifference to those disparities. 83 In Floyd, the plaintiffs, a group of
Blacks and Latinos who were stopped by the NYPD, claimed that the
NYPD's use of stop-and-frisk violated their constitutional rights under the
Fourth and Fourteenth amendments. 84 From the outset of its decision, the
Floyd Court determined that this case was "not primarily about the nineteen
individual stops that were the subject of testimony at trial. Rather, this case
is about whether the City has a policy or custom of violating the
Constitution by making unlawful stops and conducting unlawful frisks."85
In finding that New York City's stop-and-frisk policy violated the Fourth
Amendment, the Floyd Court relied on the expert testimony of plaintiffs
expert, Dr. Fagan. 86 Dr. Fagan analyzed the NYPD's 250-Form database of
4.4 million stops to evaluate how often stops lacked reasonable suspicion.87
Based on Dr. Fagan's findings, 6 percent of stops, approximately 200,000
stops, lacked reasonable suspicion.88 Dr. Fagan's results were due in large
part to NYPD officers' use of "Furtive Movement" and "High Crime Area"
as stand-alone justifications for carrying out stops. 89 Additionally, statistics
demonstrated that stops made due to "Furtive Movement" and "High Crime
Area" frequently did not result in a summons or arrest. 90 The Court
concluded that Dr. Fagan underestimated the number of unjustified stops
and the NYPD's 250-Form database was limiting because it only provided
statistics of stops recorded. 91
Although the Court believed Dr. Fagan's testimony of the stop-and-frisk
statistics demonstrated that the policy violated the Fourth Amendment, it
also evaluated institutional evidence of intentional indifference. A 1999
Attorney General Report highlighting the disparities in stops and a variety
83 Floyd, 959 F. Supp. 2d at 557, 558 (2013 action).
84 Id. at 556.
85 Id.
86 Id. at 588-89.
87 Id. at 578.
88 Id. at 559, 579.
89 Id. at 580.
90 Id
91 See id. at 560-561 (S.D.N.Y. 2013); see also Floyd v. City of New York, 861 F. Supp. 2d 274,
278 (S.D.N.Y. 2012).
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of evidence demonstrating pressure placed on officers to increase stops
were offered by the plaintiffs as institutional evidence of New York City's
and the NYPD's intentional indifference to Fourth Amendment
violations. 92 The Court found this evidence to be persuasive and concluded
that pressure on commanders and officers, asking officers to target
minorities, inadequate monitoring and supervision, partially inadequate
training, and inadequate discipline, led to an increase in stops without
reasonable suspicion.93 Therefore, the Court found the City's stop-and-frisk
policy to be unconstitutional under the Fourth Amendment.
B. FOURTEENTHAMENDMENT
1. Opening the Door for Race-Based Discriminatory Claims
Although stop-and-frisk is typically considered a Fourth Amendment
issue, the Fourteenth Amendment is also applicable. The relevant portion
of the Fourteenth Amendment as discussed in this section states that "[n]o
State shall . . . deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal
protection of the laws." 94 Historically this has meant an individual may not
be denied protection under the law based on his or her race, color, religion,
sex, or national origin.95 When the stop-and-frisk policy was first upheld as
constitutional in Terry v. Ohio, the Court expressed some concerns of
"wholesale harassment" of minority groups that may occur as a result of
the policy. 96 However, some of the first cases to analyze race-based
discrimination in the stop-and-frisk policy did not do so under the
Fourteenth Amendment. Rather, the issue was analyzed under the Fourth
Amendment's reasonableness standard. Nevertheless, these Fourth
Amendment cases opened the door for Fourteenth Amendment challenges
of the stop-and-frisk policy because claimants asserted that race rather than
reasonable suspicion was the reason for a stop and/or frisk.
In 1975, United States v. Brignoni-Ponce was one of the first cases that
examined the use of race as a justification to make a stop.97 In that case,
two Border Patrol officers pulled over a vehicle on the highway near the
U.S.-Mexican Border with three occupants that appeared to be of Mexican
92 See Floyd, 959 F. Supp. 2d at 560-61.
93 Id. at 562.
94 U.S. CONST. amend. XVI.
95 42 U.S.C.S. § 2000h-2 (2013).
96 See Terry, 392 U.S. at 14-15 (1968).
97 See United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873 (1975).
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descent. 98 The officers later admitted they pulled over the vehicle only
because its three occupants appeared to be of Mexican descent, which led
the officers to believe they were illegal aliens.99 After questioning the three
occupants, officers learned that two of them were in the U.S. illegally.oo
All three men were arrested and the respondent was charged with two
counts of knowingly transporting illegal immigrants.101 In determining
whether the stop was valid, the court evaluated whether the officers had
"reasonable grounds to believe that the three occupants were aliens."1 02
The Supreme Court concluded that the stop violated the Fourth
Amendment because the officers did not have reasonable suspicion to
believe that "criminal activity may be afoot."1 03 Although this decision did
not allow race alone to meet the standard of reasonable suspicion to justify
a stop, it did not exclude race as a factor. In fact, the Court held "Mexican
appearance" could be a relevant factor where a high likelihood exists that
any given person of Mexican Ancestry is an alien.1 04
Another significant Supreme Court case that analyzed race-based
discrimination in the stop-and-frisk policy under the Fourth Amendment
was Whren v. United States.105 In that case, plainclothes officers were
patrolling a "high drug area" area in an unmarked vehicle when a dark
Pathfinder truck and its young occupants caught the officers' attention. 106
The truck remained at a stop sign for an "unusual" amount of time as the
driver looked down at the lap of the passenger in the front seat. 107 When
the officers made a U-turn to head back toward the truck, the truck turned
suddenly to its right, without signaling, and took off at an "unreasonable"
speed. 08 The officers caught the Pathfinder and pulled it over.1 09 After
introducing himself and asking the driver to place the car in park, one of
the officers immediately observed two plastic bags of crack cocaine in
petitioner Whren's lap.110 Petitioners were arrested and several drugs were
98 Id. at 875.
99 Id
100 Id
101 Id.
102 Id. at 886.
103 See Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873; see also Terry, 392 U.S. at 30.
104 Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. at 887.
105 Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806 (1996).
106 Id. at 808.
107 Id
108 Id
109 Id
110 Id. at 809.
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found in the vehicle.' 1 ' At trial, the officers testified that they stopped the
vehicle due to several traffic violations, including failure to signal and
speeding.112
The petitioners argued the officers did not have probable cause or
reasonable suspicion to believe they were engaged in illegal-drug activity
and the "asserted ground for approaching the vehicle-to give the driver a
warning concerning traffic violations-was pre-textual."ll 3 Petitioners
relied on a District of Columbia traffic regulation, which permits
plainclothes officers in unmarked vehicles to make traffic stops "'only in
the case of a violation that is so grave as to pose an immediate threat to the
safety of others,"' to demonstrate that a reasonable plainclothes officer
would not have made the stop.114 Petitioners, who were both African-
American, also contended that officers should not have the power to select
who to stop based on race, and the traffic stop test should be "whether a
police officer, acting reasonably, would have made the stop for the reasons
given."s15 The Court disagreed with the petitioners, holding that a traffic
violation arrest and a post-arrest search would not be deemed invalid
because an officer had an ulterior motive to make the traffic stop.116
Furthermore, the Court stated "subjective intent alone ... does not make
otherwise lawful conduct illegal or unconstitutional."11 7 In other words,
simply because an officer's intent did not have legal justification for his
actions "does not invalidate the action taken as long as the circumstances,
viewed objectively, justify that action."' 18 This means that an officer could
stop someone solely because of his or her race, without violating the
person's Fourth Amendment right to be secure from "unreasonable search
and seizures," as long as the officers actions, viewed objectively, have a
legal justification.119
The Court went on to say that the "Constitution prohibits selective
enforcement of the law based on considerations such as race" and
objections of such "discriminatory application of laws" should be made
under "the Equal Protection Clause, not the Fourth Amendment."120 This
Ill Whren,517U.S.at809.
112 Id. at 810.
113 Id. at 808.
114 Id. at 815.
115 Id. at 810.
116 Id. at 813.
117 Whren, 517 U.S. at 813.
118 Id.
119 U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
120 Whren, 517 U.S. at 813.
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decision made it difficult for stops and frisks to be deemed unconstitutional
under the Fourth Amendment based on race but opened the door for race-
based discriminatory claims under the Fourteenth Amendment.
Since Whren, many federal courts, but not the Supreme Court, have
reviewed the constitutionality of the stop-and-frisk policy under the
Fourteenth Amendment. These federal courts have not deemed the stop-
and-frisk policy per se unconstitutional under the Fourteenth Amendment
but have found that a state or city may violate the Equal Protection Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment by using race as the sole reason for a stop or
frisk. These cases have provided some guidelines for determining when
the implementation of the stop-and-frisk policy violates citizens' right to
Equal Protection under the law.
2. Equal Protection Clause and Stop-and-Frisk
The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment prohibits law
enforcement officials from targeting certain groups when conducting stops
and frisks.1 2 1  This protection starts even before a person is stopped
because "a law enforcement officer would be acting unconstitutionally
were he to approach and consensually interview a person of color solely
because of that person's color, absent a compelling justification." 22 This
protection also prohibits officers from investigating a person based solely
on race. 123 These limitations make the courts available as a remedy to those
groups that may be targeted by law enforcement.
To succeed in litigation, a person or group, who was targeted for an
unreasonable stop and frisk, must prove "that the defendants '[or
government official(s)]' actions had a discriminatory effect and were
motivated by a discriminatory purpose."1 24 The burden of proof is on the
party that suffered the discriminatory effect to prove the government
official(s) were motivated by a discriminatory purpose.1 25 Discriminatory
purpose implies that "the [decision maker] ... selected or reaffirmed a
particular course of action at least in part 'because of . . . its adverse
effects upon an identifiable group."1 26 A person or group targeted by such
discrimination must prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, "that a
police officer decided to approach [or pursue] him or her because of his or
121 United States v. Avery, 137 F.3d 343, 352-53 (6th Cir. 1997).
122 Id. at 353.
123 Id. at 354.
124 Chavez v. Ill. State Police, 251 F.3d 612, 635-36 (7th Cir. 2001).
125 Avery, 137 F.3d at 356.
126 Chavez, 251 F.3d at 645 (quoting McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279,298 (1987)).
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her race." 127
To prove discrimination, the targeted party must demonstrate that he or
she is a member "of a protected class, that [he or she is] otherwise similarly
situated to members of the unprotected class, and that [he or she was]
treated differently from members of the unprotected class."1 28
Discrimination can be proven through direct evidence, inferences gathered
from statistical evidence of disparate impact, or other circumstantial
evidence. 129 However, statistical evidence, without any other proof, is not
enough to prove discrimination.1 30 Additionally, "statistics proffered must
address the crucial question of whether one class is being treated differently
from another class that is otherwise similarly situated."131 Once race
discrimination has been proven through statistical evidence, the
government would then have to provide an alternate explanation for its
actions or a compelling governmental reason for its race-based seizures. 132
Due to the high volume of stops against African-Americans and Latinos
in New York City, it is critical to evaluate the stop-and-frisk policy under
the rubric of the Fourteenth Amendment. African-Americans and Latinos
are members of a protected class that is treated differently due to the color
of their skin. African-Americans and Latinos were stopped nine times
more often than all other racial groups in New York City in 2011.133 The
racial disparity of stops is an indication that at least some police officers are
racially profiling. It is highly unlikely that police officers are not racially
profiling where the percentage of African-Americans and Latinos stopped
is much higher than the percentage of African-Americans and Latinos
living in New York City. The existence of discrimination becomes more
apparent when looking at statistics of the precincts with the highest
percentage of stops. 134 The five precincts with the largest percentage of
stops were the seventy-third, twenty-third, eighty-first, forty-first, and
twenty-fifth precinct, respectively.1 35 The population of African-Americans
and Latinos in those precincts were 96.3 percent, 75.6 percent, 92.7
127 Avery, 137 F.3d at 355 (quoting United States v. Travis, 62 F.3d 170,174 (6th Cir. 1995)).
128 See Chavez, 251 F.3d at 636; see also Greer v. Amesqua, 212 F.3d 358, 370 (7th Cir. 2000),
cert. denied, 531 U.S. 1012, 121 (2000); see also Johnson v. City of Fort Wayne, Ind., 91 F.3d 922,
944-45 (7th Cir. 1996).
129 Avery, 137 F.3d at 355.
130 Id. at 356.
131 Chavez, 251 F.3d at 638.
132 Avery, 137 F.3d at 356.
133 2011 REPORT, supra note 3, at 5.
134 Id. at 4.
135 Id.
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percent, 96.9 percent, and 87.8 percent, respectively. 136 Conversely, the
precincts with the lowest percentage of stops were the nineteenth, sixty-
second, sixty-eighth, one hundred twenty-third, and sixty-sixth,
respectively.1 37 The percentage of African-Americans and Latinos in those
neighborhoods were 9.0 percent, 14.1 percent, 15.8 percent, 9.4 percent,
and 15.3 percent. 138 Additionally, African-Americans and Latinos
accounted for more than 70 percent of stops in six of the ten precincts
where their population was at its lowest. 139 These statistics demonstrate
that New York City's stop-and-frisk policy targets African-Americans and
Latinos and African-American and Latino neighborhoods for most of its
stops. Furthermore, the majority of African-Americans and Latinos (88.4
percent) who were stopped in 2011 were innocent of any crime, 140 and only
1.8 percent of those who were frisked were rarely found in possession of a
weapon. 14 1
As a result of the astonishing nature of these statistics, the Court in Floyd
v. City of New York held that the New York City stop-and-frisk policy
violated the Fourteenth Amendment.1 42 In Floyd, plaintiffs claimed that
African-Americans and Latinos were stopped more frequently than they
would be if police officers did not discriminate based on race when
deciding whom to stop.143 To determine the validity of the plaintiffs'
claims, the court compared rates of African-American and Latino stops to
"a standard, or point of reference, against which those statistics can be
compared, assessed, measured or judged," also known as a benchmark.1 44
The court chose the plaintiffs' benchmark, local population data and local
crime rates, as its benchmark. 145 The court held that this was the best
benchmark because local population data reflected who was available for
officers to stop and local crime rates reflect the fact that more stops are
likely to occur in high crime areas. 146 The court, in turn, rejected the
defendant's benchmark of suspect race description data because it was
based on the faulty premise that officers' decisions to stop individuals
136 Id. at 20.
137 Id. at 4.
138 Id. at 20.
139 2011 REPORT, supra note 3, at 5-7.
140 Id. at 10.
141 Id
142 Floyd, 959 F. Supp. 2d at 562 (2013 action).
143 Id at 583.
144 Id
145 See id. at 584-85.
146 Id at 585.
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could not be swayed by conscious or unconscious racial bias.1 47
Based on the use of the plaintiffs' benchmark to analyze the data, the
court concluded that: 1) the NYPD carried out more stops in African-
American and Latino neighborhoods, 2) regardless of the racial
composition of an area, African-Americans and Latinos were more likely to
be stopped than whites, 3) "for the period 2004 to 2009, [African-
Americans] who were subject to law enforcement action following their
stop were 30 percent more likely than whites to be arrested (as opposed to
receiving a summons) after a stop for the same suspected crime," 4) "for
the period 2004 through 2009, after controlling for suspected crime and
precinct characteristics, [African-Americans] who were stopped were about
14% more likely-and [Latinos] 9% more likely-than whites to be
subjected to the use of force," and 5) for the period 2004 through 2009, the
odds that a stop will result in further enforcement action was 8 percent
lower if the person stopped was African-American than if the person was
White. 148 The court ruled that these statistical findings and the institutional
evidence of defendants' indifference to those findings were sufficient to
conclude that New York City's stop-and-frisk policy violated the
Fourteenth Amendment. 149
IV. PHILADELPHIA STOP-AND-FRISK
A. STOP-AND-FRISK PROCEDURES
Prior to a 2011 settlement agreement, the Philadelphia stop-and-frisk
policy had many of the same problems as the New York City policy.
Philadelphia police officers were required to complete a vehicle or
pedestrian incident report known as a 75-48a form. These forms were
meant to keep track of all stop and frisks that officers made and to help
guide officers in determining when they had reasonable suspicion to make
a stop or frisk. Similar to NYPD's Unified 250 form, the Philadelphia
Police Department's (PPD) 75-48a form allowed officers to use their
individual impressions to decide whether to make a stop. Officers were
allowed to make stops if a person was "loitering," engaged in "furtive
movement," acting "suspiciously" or if the person was in a "high crime"
area. Once an officer completed the 75-48a form he or she submitted it to
his or her respective district to be uploaded to an electronic database. The
147 See id. at 585-87.
148 Floyd, 959 F. Supp. 2d at 588-89 (2013 action).
149 Id. at 667.
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database kept track of all 75-48a stops.
B. PROBLEMS WITH STOP-AND-FRISK IN PHILADELPHIA
Although Philadelphia's stop-and-frisk policy had problems since the
late 1980s, 150 those problems were exacerbated with the election of Mayor
Michael Nutter in 2007. In 2008, Mayor Nutter initiated the PPD's "Crime
Fighting Strategy."'51 His crime plan was to use criminal statistics to focus
resources on areas where the most crimes were being committed. 152 The
plan also focused on preventing crimes from occurring by using citywide
aggressive tactics such as stop and frisk.153 Mayor Nutter's plan not only
allowed officers to make more stops and frisks in high-crime areas, but also
allowed officers to stop and frisk people simply for being in a high-crime
area. A year after Mayor Nutter's plan was implemented, there were
253,333 stopS1 54 made in a city of approximately 1.5 million people.155
This was a higher person-to-stop ratio than New York City had in 2011. Of
those 253,333 stops, over 183,000 or 72.2 percent were of African-
Americans, who comprise 44 percent of Philadelphia's population. 156 Of
the stops made, only 8.4 percent resulted in an arrest. 157 Additionally, a
significant amount of the arrests carried out were for reasons other than the
suspicion that the stop and arrest was originally made.1 58 A majority of
those arrests resulted from interactions or information discovered following
the initial stop (i.e., disorderly conduct, outstanding warrants).1 59 These
statistics demonstrate the ineffectiveness of the aggressive stop-and-frisk
tactics to prevent crime from occurring and their discriminatory nature in
stopping a disproportionate amount of African-Americans. Due to the
disparity in the stops of African-Americans, it is apparent that officers in
Philadelphia were not just using reasonable suspicion to make stops but
were also using race as a factor. If race were not a factor then the number
150 See Complaint at 19, Bailey v. Philadelphia, C.A. No. 10-5952, (E.D. Pa. 2010), available at
http://www.aclupa.org/download file/viewinline/669/198/ [hereinafter Bailey Complaint].
151 See generally PHILADELPHIA POLICE DEPARTMENT, PHILADELPHIA POLICE DEPARTMENT
CRIME FIGHTING STRATEGY (2008), available at
http://www.youngphillypolitics.com/nuttercrime-Plan, available at
http://www.phila.gov/pdfs/CrimePlanFinal.pdf.
152 Id. at 17-18.
153 Id. at 11.
154 Bailey Complaint at 21.
155 QUICKFACTS, supra note 27.
156 Bailey Complaint at 154.
157 Id.
158 Id
159 Id
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of stops should at least be slightly relative to the percentages of
Philadelphia's population. However, this is not the case. 160
C. LITIGATIONAS A REMEDY
As a result of the disparity in Philadelphia's stop-and-frisk policy,
citizens of Philadelphia have sought relief from the courts. In the 1980s
several class action suits filed in the federal courts prohibited stop-and-frisk
procedures because they violated the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment
rights of African-Americans and Latinos in Philadelphia. 16 1 In 1996, the
National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP)
sued the City of Philadelphia and its police department for "the unlawful
arrest, search and prosecution of hundreds of persons on false or otherwise
improper narcotics charges, virtually all of whom were African-American
or Latino." 162 Ultimately, the City agreed to settle the matter, vacating
hundreds of convictions and agreeing to improve its stop-and-frisk
policy. 163 Under the 1996 settlement agreement, Philadelphia agreed to: (1)
require its officers to fill out a 75-48a form for every stop they made, (2)
appoint an Integrity and Accountability officer responsible for ensuring the
City's compliance with the settlement agreement and for reviewing the
stop-and-frisk data to determine if any racial bias existed, and (3) allow the
plaintiffs lawyers to review and analyze the 75-48a data "to determine
whether there was probable cause or reasonable suspicion for the officers'
actions and whether the stops and investigations of persons were
undertaken in a racially biased manner."1 64 Although the City complied
with the agreement, the agreement terminated in 2005 without any long-
term measure in place to stop Mayor Nutter, elected in 2008, from
instituting a more aggressive stop-and-frisk policy.
V. CITY OF PHILADELPHIA 2011 SETTLEMENT & FLOYD COURT'S
REFORMS
On November 4, 2010, the American Civil Liberties Union of
Pennsylvania and the law firm of Kairys, Rudovsky, and Messing &
Feinberg filed a federal class action suit against the City of Philadelphia
160 Id.
161 Id. at 19.
162 Bailey Complaint at 19.
163 Id.
164 Id. at 19-20.
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and its police department known as Bailey v. City of Philadelphia.165 The
suit was filed on behalf of eight African-American and Latino men who
were stopped by Philadelphia police officers based solely on their race. 166
The suit alleged that thousands of people were stopped, frisked, and
detained by the PPD as part of its stop-and-frisk policy in violation of
plaintiffs' Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment rights.167 None of the stops
or frisks led to the recovery of weapons or to the conviction of any
crime. 168 The plaintiffs sought a declaration that the stop-and-frisk policy
was unconstitutional as well as injunctive and compensatory relief.1 69
After over a year of motions and negotiations, the parties agreed to
settle. The settlement agreement included certain disclosure and
monitoring stipulations and changes to the PPD's stop-and-frisk policy.
Under the agreement, the PPD agreed to allow plaintiffs counsel access to
the Department's 75-48a forms for selected two-week periods in the years
2006 to 2010.170 Although plaintiffs' counsel may not sue for violations
taking place within those two-week periods, they do get to analyze the
City's stop-and-frisk policy by examining its 75-48a forms. The City of
Philadelphia also agreed to continue to input all 75-48a forms into an
electronic database and allow the plaintiffs' counsel to have access.171 This
access would allow plaintiffs' counsel to monitor any disparity of stops and
frisks. Plaintiffs' counsel would be allowed to conduct periodic reviews of
stops and frisks to determine if any disciplinary action needed to be taken
against an officer, commanding officer, or the PPD as a whole.1 72 Changes
were also made as to which circumstances on the 75-48a form constitute
reasonable suspicion.1 73 A stop and frisk due to furtive movement,
"suspicious" behavior, loitering, being in a "high crime" or high drug area
is no longer permissible.1 74 The last major stipulation of the agreement was
the appointment of Dean Joanne Epps of the Temple University Beasley
School of Law as an independent outside auditor who will conduct
analysis, audit all proposals and procedures, and will have the authority to
165 Bailey v. City of Philadelphia, C.A. No. 10-5952, available at
http://www.aclupa.org/download-file/view-inline/744/198/ (last visited Sept. 8 2014).
166 Id
167 Bailey Complaint at 7-16.
168 Id.
169 Id. at 29-30.
170 Bailey Decree at 3.
171 Id
172 Id. at 4.
173 Id
174 Id
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recommend additional policies, practices, and procedures to ensure
compliance. 175
Turning back to New York City's police, after declaring the New York
City stop-and-frisk policy unconstitutional under the Fourth and Fourteenth
Amendments, the Floyd Court ordered several reforms to the policy. 176
Prior to listing the reforms, the Court appointed an independent monitor to
oversee the reform process. 177 The independent monitor is responsible for
assuring New York City's compliance with reforming the use of the
NYPD's stop-and-frisk policy.1 78
One reform the Court ordered was a revision of the policies and training
materials related to the stop-and-frisk policy and racial profiling. 179 The
purpose of this reform is to ensure officers are trained how to make
constitutional stops and frisks.180 The Court also ordered a change to stop-
and-frisk documentation. 181 The first document the Court ordered to be
changed is the UF-250-Form.1 82 The Court ordered the UF-250-form: 1)
include a narrative section where the officer must record, in her own words,
the basis for the stop, 2) require a separate explanation of why a pat-down,
frisk, or search was performed, 3) contain a tear-off portion stating the
reason for the stop, which can be given to each stopped person at the end of
the encounter, and 4) include a simplified and improved checkbox system
used to indicate common stop justification.1 83 Regarding stop-and-frisk
documentation, the Court also required all uniformed officers provide
narrative descriptions of stops in their activity logs whenever a 250-Form is
prepared.1 84
Other reforms the Court ordered include changes to supervision,
monitoring, and discipline, participation in a joint remedial process, which
allows all parties in the litigation to develop remedial measures to improve
stop-and frisk, and the use of body-worn cameras by one officer in one
precinct of each borough. 185 These reforms were intended to prevent
officers from making unconstitutional stops, involve the community in the
175 See Bailey Decree at 5, 8.
176 Floyd, 959 F. Supp. 2d at 671 (2013 action).
177 Id. at 676.
178 Id. at 677.
179 Id at 679.
180 Id.
181 Id at 681.
182 Floyd, 959 F. Supp. 2d at 681.
183 Id. at 681-682.
184 Id. at 682-683.
185 Id. at 683-687.
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reform of stop-and-frisk, and to monitor how stops and frisks are carried
out. 18 6
This Note proposes that in addition to the reforms ordered by the Floyd
Court, New York City should also adopt two critical aspects of the
Philadelphia settlement. In addition to the reforms ordered by the Floyd
Court, the NYPD should also grant civil rights groups that represent
victims of illegal stops and frisks access to its Unified Form 250 electronic
database. This access should give these organizations the ability to
determine why people were stopped, in which precinct they were stopped,
who stopped them, and any other pertinent information that will allow them
to determine whether stop-and-frisk is being carried out constitutionally.
This assures the affected communities that progress is being made. The
NYPD should also eliminate "furtive movement," "high crime area," and
any other similarly vague term on the UF-250-form. This will decrease the
likelihood that an officer stops someone based solely on his or her race.
One suggestion that was not considered in the Philadelphia settlement or
the reforms in Floyd, but New York City should adopt, is the creation of an
outside disciplinary body to deal with officers who carry out stops and
frisks with less than reasonable suspicion or to deal with commanding
officers that are not correcting this behavior. Allowing the NYPD to
continue to regulate itself allows it to reward officers who violate the rights
of African-Americans and Latinos on a daily basis and to ostracize those
officers who follow the law.
VI. CONCLUSION
Everyday in the streets of New York City, young African-American and
Latino males are asked to prove where they live as they walk down the
very same street where they have lived all their lives. They are frisked and
searched as if they were criminals while their friends and neighbors watch.
They are too often disrespected and belittled if they question why they are
subjected to such treatment. They are then released without any
explanation for why they were stopped in the first place. This treatment
disproportionately affects the African-American and Latino community of
New York City, and it can no longer be justified with the claim that crimes
most often take place in these communities. Statistics compiled by the
New York Civil Liberties Union and by the NYPD and reviewed by the
Southern District in Floyd v. City of New York have proven that stops and
186 Id
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frisks do not reduce the number of weapons on the streets and do not
significantly reduce crime. 187 Just this past year, the number of homicides
in New York City dropped to an all-time low since the 1960s while the
number of stops dropped by 30 percent compared to 2011.188 Furthermore,
88.3 percent of people stopped in 2011 had not committed any crime.1 89
African-Americans and Latinos should not continue to be harassed,
humiliated, and their rights violated for a policy that has not proven to be
effective.
Although Floyd v. City of New York appears to be the solution African-
Americans and Latinos had been waiting for, the City will not go down
without a fight. In fact, the City recently filing a notice of appeal.1 90 Even
if the Floyd decision is reversed, New York City should adopt the reforms
suggested in the district court's decision. Additionally, the NYPD should
be regulated by an outside entity that can evaluate police conduct
objectively. Racial profiling and excessive stops have become a part of
NYPD culture and have too often been rewarded rather than disciplined.
To effectively change this culture, police officers need to be held
accountable for violating the rights of African-Americans and Latinos, and
officers who follow the law need to have an entity they can safely reach out
to if they are feeling pressure from their commanding officers. Finally,
civil rights groups that represent victims of illegal stops and frisks should
be granted access to the NYPD's Unified Form 250 electronic database so
they can monitor the policy's progress. These modifications will prevent
the further persecution and degradation of the African-American and
Latino communities that, for the most part, have lost faith and respect for
the NYPD.
187 See STOP AND FRISK FACTS, supra note 7. See also New York City Murder Rate 2012, supra
note 42.
188 New York City Murder Rate 2012, supra note 42.
189 2011 REPORT, supra note 3.
190 NYC files notice of appeal in police stop-and-frisk case, first step in process, Fox NEWS,
available at http://www.foxnews.com/us/2013/08/16/nyc-files-notice-appeal-in-police-stop-and-frisk-
case-first-step-in-process/. (last visited October 2, 2014).
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